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Abstract 
 
Economic models of information security 
investment suggest estimating cost and benefit to make 
an information security investment decision. However, 
the intangible nature of information security 
investment prevents managers from applying cost-
benefit analysis in practice. Instead, information 
security managers may follow experts’ 
recommendations or the practices of other 
organizations. The present paper examines factors 
that influence information security managers’ 
investment decisions from the reputational herding 
perspective. The study was conducted using survey 
questionnaire data collected from 106 organizations 
in Finland. The findings of the study reveal that the 
ability and reputation of the security manager and the 
strength of the information about the security 
investment significantly motivate the security manager 
to discount his or her own information. Herding, as a 
following strategy, together with mandatory 
requirements are significant motivations for 
information security investment. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
As information security incidents grow in 
frequency, there has been an increase in recent years 
in the costs of managing and mitigating breaches. It is 
estimated that cybercrime is costing organizations, on 
average $11.7 million per organization [1]. Budgeting 
for information security expenditures is a crucial 
resource allocation decision in organizations. The 
budgeting question of information security investment 
is often addressed via two main research streams. One 
research stream analyzes the budgeting question 
through traditional decision analysis. This approach 
compares the risk and return of investments. The 
return on an information security investment does not 
come from increased revenues or decreased costs but 
from reducing security risks [2]. Such risk analysis is 
based on the measurement of security risk = 
(likelihood of a loss event) × (cost of a loss event) [3] 
or more complex variations, such as the value-at-risk 
approach [4]. The most influential work in this 
research stream is by Gordon and Loeb [5]. By 
comparing the cost of investment and the potential loss 
caused by possible security breaches, they found that 
the optimal security investment would be far less than 
(with a theoretical maximum of less than 40% of) the 
potential loss if a security breach does happen, and that 
the optimal security investment does not necessarily 
increase with system vulnerability. Another research 
stream employs game theory to view information 
security investments based on the actions and 
reactions between a firm and the attackers [6, 7, 8]. 
From the methodological perspective, the game theory 
approach is best suited for modeling the outcome of a 
specific security technology with limited rounds (often 
two or three) of actions and reactions between a 
limited number of players (often, the firm and the 
attacker). 
However, due to uncertainty in information 
security, it is difficult to apply cost-benefit analysis in 
practice. First, an information security investment has 
intangible benefits [2]. Estimating the expected costs 
related to information security activities is difficult 
because organizations cannot get historical data to 
make predictions. But estimating the expected benefits 
is even harder, as estimating the expected benefits 
requires managers to have information on potential 
losses from security breaches and the probability of 
such breaches. Second, there are no reliable actuarial 
loss statistics [9]; therefore, it is not possible to 
estimate the future benefits expected to be derived 
from information security investments [10]. However, 
although game theory is suitable from a 
methodological perspective, applying game theory 
requires estimating the attacker’s utility parameters, 
which is much more difficult, if not impossible, than 
estimating those of the targeted firm. 
In practice, information security managers usually 
intend to follow the decisions of other experts and best 
practices. For example, information security managers 
have noted that the expenditure budgeted for 
information security for their organizations is largely 
driven by best practices in the industry [10]. As a 
concrete example, ISO-IEC 27002 recommends 
having employee security awareness training 
programs; in 2014, 51% of respondent companies 
were reported to have security awareness and training 
programs, and 57% of respondent companies required 
Proceedings of the 52nd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2019
URI: https://hdl.handle.net/10125/59926
ISBN: 978-0-9981331-2-6
(CC BY-NC-ND 4.0) Page 4885
employees complete training on privacy policies [11]. 
Occasionally, organizations may adopt information 
security technology by following the practices of other 
organizations. Studies have shown that organizations 
tend to chase the hottest IT [12]. For example, anti-
virus software, network access control software, 
identity management technology, and encryption of 
desktop PCs are popular applications among 
organizations [13]. 
The present paper examines the strategy adopted 
by managers in information security investment. The 
objective of the present paper is to explore factors that 
influence an information security manager’s 
investment decision. This paper makes several 
potential theoretical and empirical contributions in this 
regard. 
 
2. Theoretical framework  
 
2.1. Reputation-based herding behavior 
 
Different from the rational assumption in 
neoclassical economics, which assumes that decision-
makers gather complete information, design all 
possible alternatives, compare, and choose an 
alternative [14], herding behavior was originally used 
to describe the behavior of investment decision-
makers who follow the decisions of earlier adopters 
[15, 16]. Herding behavior has also been found in IT 
adoption, for example, downloading popular software 
products [17], adopting wiki systems [18], and general 
purchase decision-making [19]. 
Scharfstein and Stein [20] developed the 
reputational herding model, in which they suggested 
that managers with good reputations are more 
conservative in bucking the consensus and herd to 
protect their current status. Sun [18] developed two 
new concepts to describe herding behavior in 
technology adoption: imitating others and discounting 
own information. Imitating others describes the degree 
to which a person follows others’ decisions when 
adopting a technology, and discounting own 
information concerns the degree to which a person 
disregards his or her own beliefs about a particular 
technology when making an adoption decision. 
In this paper, we explore factors that motivate 
decision-makers to discount their own information and 
how discounting own information affects information 
security investments. 
Network externalities, information cascades, and 
herding behavior are similar (but still different) 
concepts that have been used to study imitative 
behavior. Network externality emphasizes that “the 
value of a technology increases as the number of its 
users increases” [21]. Network externalities tend to 
reward herding decisions with increased payoffs to 
those who associate themselves with the majority. The 
rewards of such marginal increases in value go to 
previous members of the herd, not to the member who 
just joined. There are two ways to differentiate 
reputational herding from network externalities. First, 
a value-adding mechanism is not necessary in 
reputational herding. The main motivations for 
reputational herding are to overcome uncertainty and 
maintain reputation. Second, the two are based on 
different theoretical backgrounds. Reputational 
herding results from the agency problem (which 
comes from information asymmetry), while network 
externalities are based on economies of scale. 
Information cascade refers to when a decision-
maker ignores his or her own private information, 
which is overwhelmed by publicly observable 
information, and instead, mimics others’ actions [22]. 
Information cascade theory is also associated with the 
theory of institutional mimetic isomorphism, in which 
institutions tend to imitate each another in technology 
adoption decision-making [16, 23, 24]. Reputational 
herding theory and information cascade theory share 
the characteristics peer influences and uncertainty in 
decision-making. Reputational herding differs from an 
information cascade in that the former includes 
managers’ reputational concerns in addition to the 
latter. Information cascade theory shows that herding 
behavior can be tracked back to information 
asymmetries and the problems associated with 
observational learning. However, the reputational 
herding model demonstrates that herding may be 
caused by managerial incentive problems. Therefore, 
the reputational herding model connects agency theory 
and rational observational learning. 
 
2.2. Research model and hypotheses 
 
To understand information security investment 
decision-making in organizations, reputational 
herding theory [20] is used as the basis for our 
theoretical model (Figure 1). Reputational herding 
theory claims that if an investment manager is 
uncertain about his or her ability to decide on an 
investment, conformity with other investment 
professionals is a good choice [20]. This is because of 
the following key assumptions of the theory: i) There 
are systematically unpredictable components of the 
investment value, and ii) smart managers make similar 
decisions. If managers make the same decision as 
others, they will be evaluated more favorably because 
they can share the blame. Reputational herding theory 
emphasizes the unpredictability of the value of 
decisions; therefore, the theory explains decision-
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making under uncertainty very well. We expect this 
theory to be well suited for explaining information 
security investment, which also involves 
unpredictability of the value. 
 
 
Figure 1. Research model 
 
2.2.1. Strength of the information. In the 
reputational herding model, previous information [20] 
refers to information that has previously been made 
public and shows a probability of deriving profit from 
an investment. The reputational herding model 
suggests that when previous information is strong and 
consistent with the majority’s actions, the decision-
maker tends to follow the actions of the majority. 
Here, following Hirshleifer [25], we define the 
strength of information as the extremeness of public 
information that shows the probability of deriving 
profit from an information security investment. Based 
on this, we construct our first hypothesis: 
H1: The strength of the information is positively 
associated with information security investment. 
 
2.2.2. Ability to analyze an investment decision. 
When a person has incomplete information, he or she 
perceives inability to predict something accurately 
[26]. In the information security investment context, it 
is usually difficult for information security managers 
to predict when hackers’ next attack will occur, 
especially successful, expensive, and destructive 
attacks (state of uncertainty). The damage from an 
information security breach (or attack) is difficult for 
information security managers to assess (effect 
uncertainty). It is also difficult to guarantee that the 
information security investment will efficiently 
prevent all security breaches (response uncertainty). 
                                                 
1 IS studies that focused on uncertainty related to IS complexity, IS 
performance and quality operationalize uncertainty so as to 
represent the level of uncertainty anxiety experienced by users 
related to a change, which refers to the psychological uncertainty 
and the associated stress. Our ability construct does not need to 
Consequently, it is difficult to accurately predict the 
value of the information security investment.1 
Previous research has shown that when people feel 
uncertain about a decision, they are likely to follow 
others [18, 27, 28, 29]. Therefore, we construct the 
following hypotheses: 
H2a: A manager’s ability to accurately predict the 
value of an information security investment is 
positively associated with the information security 
investment.  
H2b: A manager’s ability to accurately predict the 
value of an information security investment is 
negatively associated with discounting his or her own 
information. 
 
2.2.3. Managers’ reputation. Reputation can be 
important to managers because it brings autonomy, 
power, and career success [30]. Reputation shows a 
manager’s ability. From the agency theory 
perspective, a manager’s reputation also indicates that 
his or her behavior is predictable, and no close monitor 
is needed for a manager’s actions. As managers gain a 
good reputation, they also gain power [31, 32], which 
may be derived from not only formal but also informal 
authority; the authority to delegate tasks is an example 
of this power. Reputation also has the ability to affect 
performance evaluations, promotions, and 
compensation [33]. 
A manager’s reputation is updated when the labor 
market checks whether he or she makes smart 
decisions. A smart decision can be evaluated in terms 
of whether it is a profitable decision for the 
organization or whether the decision is similar to those 
made in other organizations [20]. If reputation is 
important to managers, they may generally avoid 
making dumb decisions. For instance, Brandenburger 
and Polak [34] suggested that a firm can have a 
reputational incentive to make investment decisions 
that are consistent with a previous belief regarding the 
profitability of a project, even if the firm has superior 
information than public. 
As we discussed above, the difficulty of accurately 
predicting the value of an information security 
investment results in difficulty evaluating whether 
managers’ decisions are profitable. Therefore, 
managers who have reputational concerns tend to 
make decisions that are consistent with others’ 
decisions to maintain their reputations. Based on this, 
we construct the following hypotheses: 
measure the anxiety, but only measure if the manager is able to 
calculate cost and benefit related with information security 
investment. 
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H3a: A manager’s reputation is positively 
associated with herd behavior. 
H3b: Reputation enhances the relationship 
between ability and information security investment. 
 
2.2.4. Impact of discounting own information on 
information security investment. Previous 
researchers suggested two main reasons why 
investment managers mimic the investment decisions 
of other managers. First, managers mimic others to 
avoid the risk of being considered incapable [20, 28]. 
Second, if a manager makes an unprofitable 
investment by following others, “sharing the blame” 
with others who made the same decision makes the 
mistake more acceptable. Herding is considered a 
legitimate strategy for people with good reputations to 
protect their status [28]. In the context of information 
security investment, a manager may imitate others in 
making an investment decision. Even if the decision 
turns out to be inefficient, the manager is not alone in 
having made the wrong decision and thus, shares the 
blame with others who also accepted or rejected an 
efficient information security investment. Thus, this 
potentially spares the manager his or her own 
reputation. Such a positive association with herd 
behavior leads to the construction of the following 
hypothesis: 
H4: Discounting one’s own information is 
positively associated with a manager’s information 
security investment decision. 
 
2.2.5. Mandatory requirements. As more people 
have realized the value of information, governments 
have enacted various laws to secure information in 
cyberspace, such as the Gramm-Leach-Billy Act, the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act, the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act Security Rule, the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the recent EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018. Security 
managers are faced with the complex challenge of 
meeting the multiple compliance requirements of a 
growing array of federal, state, and industry standards. 
Given this aim, we sought to determine whether 
mandatory requirements ensure compliance. This 
investigation led to the formulation of the following 
hypothesis: 
H5: Mandatory requirements are positively 
associated with a manager’s information security 
investment. 
 
3. Research method and data analysis  
 
3.1. Operationalization of constructs 
 
This study utilized instruments that were validated 
in previous studies. For example, the items used to 
measure discounting one’s own information were 
adopted from Sun [18], items assessing reputation 
were adopted from Zinko et al. [30], items assessing 
mandatory requirements were adopted from Boss et al. 
[35] and items assessing use of information security 
management standards were adopted from Beaudry 
and Pinsonneault [36]. We adopted previous measures 
after carefully considering the information security 
investment context. All items were assessed using a 
seven-point Likert scale. 
Because there were no previously validated 
instruments for assessing ability and the strength of 
information, we developed new instruments in this 
study to assess ability and strength. We followed the 
procedure from Mackenzie et al. [37]. The instrument 
development process resulted in four items for 
assessing ability and three items for assessing the 
strength of the information. Content validity for all 
measures was established through a literature review 
and a content validity expert panel that comprised 
eight researchers (faculty and doctoral students) who 
were skilled in quantitative research methods. 
 
3.2. Pretest 
 
A pretest survey was conducted at one university 
in Finland. A total of 32 responses were collected. An 
open question was included to allow the participants 
to comment on the wording, content, and length of the 
questionnaire. The questionnaire was revised using the 
responses. To assess the reliability of the scales, 
Cronbach’s alpha [38] was used. Items with high 
“Cronbach’s alpha if item deleted” statistics, or small 
standard deviation scores (and thus, low explanatory 
power) were deleted, bearing in mind the content 
validity. 
 
3.3. Survey administration 
 
The main field study was conducted among 
information security managers in Finland, a developed 
country in which a number of organizations are 
increasingly aware of information security investment 
issues. The survey was sent to the 1,042 Finnish 
companies. A research assistant called these 
companies and asked for the name of the chief 
information security officer (CISO) or a similar title. 
The survey was mailed to them. As an incentive to 
participate, we offered to provide the organizations a 
report of the findings upon conclusion of the study. 
Out of the 1,042 surveys distributed to these 
organizations, 110 responses were obtained. 
Respondents returned the completed surveys by using 
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envelopes with pre-paid postage. We conducted a 
structured data screening process. First, we dropped 4 
respondents who did not answer a large portion of the 
questions. The number of missing values for each 
variable was 0.92%, which means we could use the 
rest of the respondents. We then replaced the missing 
values with a median value. The variance of each 
respondent ranged from 0.5 to 2.2, showing that 
respondents did not answer arbitrarily. The skewness 
and kurtosis values were between –1 and 1, showing 
the normality of the data. No outlier values were found 
in the data. 
The required sample size for evaluating the model 
was 60, according to the “rule of ten” heuristic [39]. 
Given the difficulty of reaching CISOs in large 
companies, this response rate is acceptable. More 
importantly, the returned surveys were completed by 
managers with firsthand knowledge of their 
companies’ information security management, as 
evidenced by their position and the length of time in 
which they have held their position. Table 1 
summarizes the demographic information, which 
suggests that the sample was heterogeneous. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the 
respondents 
 Frequency (%) 
Gender   
Male 92 (86.79) 
Female 14 (14.77) 
Age Average = 45.16 
Experience (years) Average = 10.73 
Education  
Vocational 4 (4.55) 
College level 17 (19.32) 
Bachelor’s degree 21 (23.86) 
Master’s degree 45 (51.14) 
Ph.D. 1 (1.14) 
Previous experience  
Yes  57 (64.77) 
No  31 (35.23) 
Size of organization  
(number of employees) 
 
1–100 8 (9.10) 
101–249 11 (12.5) 
250–499 11 (12.5) 
500–999 10 (11.36) 
1,000+ 48 (54.55) 
 
4. Data analysis  
 
Data analysis was performed using SmartPLS, 
version 3.0 [40]. A partial least squares (PLS) 
technique was selected to test the hypotheses, because 
PLS is more suitable than the covariance-based 
approach for conducting exploratory research [41]. 
The primary focus of this research is understanding 
each specific path coefficient and variance explained 
rather than the overall model fit. Thus, PLS is a more 
appropriate method for this research, relative to 
covariance-based tools. 
 
4.1. Measurement validation 
 
The latent variables show good reliability. Table 2 
shows the Cronbach’s alpha, composite reliability, and 
average variance extracted  (AVE) of each construct 
and shows the internal consistency of the model. All 
constructs have a Cronbach’s alpha value higher than 
0.7 and thus, display convergent validity [42]. 
Furthermore, they all show a composite reliability 
greater than the proposed threshold of 0.7 that 
literature considers good for explanatory purposes 
[43]. In addition, the AVE of all constructs is higher 
than the proposed threshold of 0.5 [44], which means 
that the error variance does not exceed the explained 
variance [42]. 
 
Table 2. Construct reliability and validity 
 Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
Composite 
Reliability 
AVE 
A 0.722 0.721 0.565 
DOI 0.756 0.725 0.584 
Mand 0.925 0.93 0.822 
R 0.893 0.894 0.679 
SI 0.899 0.904 0.764 
USE 0.857 0.86 0.675 
 
To assess discriminant validity, we use the 
Heterotrait-Monotrait (HTMT) ratio, as Henseler et al. 
[45] argued it is superior to the Fornell and Larcker 
criterion [46]. Table 3 shows that all HTMT ratios are 
below the strict cutoff value of 0.85 proposed by Kline 
[47] which indicates good discriminant validity. 
 
Table 3. HTMT ratios to assess 
discriminant validity 
 A DOI Mand R SI USE 
A 1      
DOI 0.227 1     
Mand 0.279 0.535 1    
R 0.713 0.388 0.226 1   
SI 0.613 0.235 0.259 0.637 1  
USE 0.735 0.547 0.521 0.531 0.526 1 
 
To assess common method bias, we chose the 
statistical approach suggested by Podsakoff et al. [48] 
and applied by Liang et al. [49]. As suggested, we 
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created the PLS model and included a common 
method factor that linked to all the single-indicator 
constructs that were converted from the observed 
indicators. Because the method factor loadings were 
not statistically significant and the indicators’ 
substantive variances were substantially greater than 
their method variances, we concluded that common 
method bias is unlikely to be a serious concern. 
 
4.2. Structural model testing 
 
Given that the data displayed factorial validity and 
did not display common method bias, the structural 
model was tested. The results of the structural model 
are presented in Table 4. We used bootstrapping with 
1000 samples to determine whether the relations 
between the constructs were statistically significant 
and supported the hypotheses. The table shows that all 
hypotheses are supported. We determined the effect 
size f-squared of each variable according to the 
formula by Hair et al. [50]. Effect sizes are considered 
small if they are above 0.02, medium if they are above 
0.15, and large if they are above 0.35 [51]. Table 4 
shows the effect sizes of the variables. It reveals that 
A (ability) has the highest influence on USE 
(information security investment) and R (reputation) 
has the highest influence on discounting own 
information (DOI). Meanwhile, A also has a large 
influence on DOI, and R also has a large influence on 
USE. Strength of information (SI) and Mandatory 
requirements (Mand) have only a small positive 
influence (although statistically significant) on USE. 
The moderation effect between A and R has a large 
influence on DOI.
 
Table 4. Path coefficients and effect sizes 
Hypothesis  
Path 
coefficients 
T 
statistics 
P value 
Supported R square 
included 
R square 
excluded 
Effect 
size 
 
H1 SI -> USE 0.045 2.206 0.028 Yes 0.751 0.748 0.012 Small 
H2a A -> USE 0.633 5.157 0.000 Yes 0.751 0.548 0.815 Large 
H2b A -> DOI -0.393 2.153 0.029 Yes 0.336 0.134 0.304 Large 
H3a R -> DOI 0.820 4.053 0.000 Yes 0.336 0.044 0.440 Large 
H3b A*R -> DOI 0.460 2.692 0.007 Yes 0.336 0.137 0.300 Large 
H4 DOI -> USE 0.359 2.749 0.006 Yes 0.751 0.672 0.317 Large 
H5 Mand -> USE 0.139 2.898 0.004 Yes 0.751 0.740 0.044 Small 
The adjusted R-squared of the model is 0.722 (USE as 
a dependent variable), and 0.369 (DOI as a dependent 
variable). The constructs of USE explain 72.2% of its 
variance, and the constructs of DOI explain 36.9% of 
its variance. 
 
5. Discussion and implication 
 
5.1. Discussion of the results 
 
This study developed a model to understand how 
information security managers make investment 
decisions. First, the findings demonstrate that when 
managers make decisions about information security 
investments, the ability to accurately predict the net 
benefit of the decision is important for security 
managers. This ability positively influences the 
information security investment decision (H2a) and 
negatively influences security managers’ intention to 
discount their own information (H2b). During this 
process, a security manager’s reputation plays an 
important role. A security manager who has a higher 
reputation is more conservative and therefore, tends to 
discount his or her own information more (H3a). 
Reputation also enhances the relationship between a 
security manager’s ability and his or her intention to 
discount his or her own information. When a security 
manager with a high reputation cannot accurately 
predict the net benefit of a security investment 
decision, he or she has more intention to discount his 
or her own information (H3b). In addition, when 
information security managers observe a considerable 
number of organizations that have made the same 
information security investments, the managers are 
more likely to make the same decision (H1). To sum 
up, the factors above influence an information security 
manager’s intention to discount his or her own 
information (therefore, adopt a herding strategy) in 
making information security investment decisions. 
This model also shows that discounting one’s own 
information is statistically significantly associated 
with information security investments (H4). Although 
this is the first application of reputational herding 
theory to information security investment research, 
previous studies in other fields have shown that 
reputational herding theory is an effective strategy in 
making decisions under uncertainty. Take Graham 
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[28], for example, who studied herding behavior 
among investment newsletters. By using the data of 
analysts who published investment newsletters, he 
found that if the analyst’s reputation is high, if the 
analyst’s ability is low, or if the signal correlation is 
high, the analyst is likely to follow investment 
newsletter’s recommendation. 
In addition, the present results show that 
mandatory government or industry requirements 
strongly affect information security investments (H5). 
The result is consistent with information security 
literature. Kayworth and Whitten ([52], p. 165) 
claimed that “security managers are faced with the 
complex challenge of meeting multiple compliance 
requirements from a growing array of federal, state, 
and industry standards.” For example, in 2018, the EU 
GDPR replaced the Data Protection Directive 
95/46/EC and aims to reshape the way organizations 
across the region approach data privacy. The EU 
GDPR requires organizations have clear language to 
explain their privacy policies, obtain affirmative 
consent from users before their data can be used, 
clearly inform users about data transfers, collect and 
process data only with a well-defined purpose and 
inform users about new purposes for processing the 
data, and inform users whether the decision is 
automated and provide users with the possibility of 
contesting it. In general, organizations must spend 
more time and resources on privacy and security issues 
to comply with the EU GDPR. From all the discussion 
above, we conclude that when the perceived net 
benefit is difficult to accurately predict, an information 
security manager may adopt a herding strategy to 
make information security investment decisions. 
 
5.2. Implications for research and practice 
 
This is the first study that provides more 
motivations than benefit-driven via financial 
analytical tools for information security investments. 
Previous studies developed economic models or 
financial indicators to estimate the optimal level of 
information security investment. However, economic 
models do not work well because actuarial data is 
lacking. This empirical study explored and tested 
influential factors that were not included in previous 
economic models, for example, information security 
managers’ ability to accurately calculate the costs and 
benefits of information security investment, 
information security managers’ reputation, etc.  
 
5.2.1. Implications for research. The primary 
contribution of this study is to suggest herding as 
managers’ strategy in information security investment 
and to investigate the influential factors of a herding 
strategy. As information security investment managers 
are uncertain about the intangible costs and benefits of 
information security investments, applying an 
economic model or financial indicator is impossible. 
Therefore, information security managers employ 
supplementary strategies. This study also encourages 
that other supplementary strategies that can be utilized 
in information security investment decision-making be 
investigated in future research. 
The intangible nature of information security 
investment limits information security managers’ 
ability to accurate estimate the costs and benefits of 
information security investments [53]. Therefore, 
theories that address the concern of making decisions 
under uncertainty may be relevant. For example, Black 
[54] suggested, “Noise in the sense of a large number 
of small events is often a causal factor much more 
powerful than a small number of large events can be” 
([54], p 529). In stock markets, when investment 
managers (or individual stock buyers) are uncertain 
about the results of one stock and lack necessary 
information to analyze potential benefits (or losses), 
they might invest based on noise. Shleifer and 
Summers [55] pointed to the advice of financial gurus 
as one example of noise. In line with that idea, 
Menkhoff [56] showed that investors tend to follow 
experts’ opinions. For example, information security 
investment managers are more willing to invest in 
implementing information security investment 
standards that are deemed by experts to be the best 
practice. 
In addition to the theory discussion above, 
different theories in behavioral economics (such as 
cognitive biases, heuristics, and investor’s sentiment) 
can be applied to explain and predict the issues in this 
research stream. Testable theories in terms of 
explaining and predicting [57] can be built with 
variance or factor models. 
 
5.2.2. Implications for practice. Two potential 
practical implications can be highlighted from the 
present results. First, practitioners should observe that 
it is not possible to accurately estimate the optimal 
level of information security investment due to the 
intangible nature of information security investment. 
In practice, information security investment managers 
should switch from pondering the quantitative amount 
of an information security investment to paying 
attention to what influences information security 
investment decision-making. Organizations must 
understand that using only cost-benefit analysis may 
lead to errors in information security investment 
decision-making. However, it may be more realistic to 
pay attention to the practices followed by other 
companies and then make investment decisions. 
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Second, cognitive limitations are inevitable in any 
kind of decision-making. In practice, information 
security managers can investigate whether these 
cognitive limitations have affected their decision-
making. Regarding the reputational concern of 
information security investment managers, we suggest 
that senior management and supervisors should 
communicate more about the work of information 
security investment managers. Therefore, the agency 
problem between supervisors and managers could be 
eliminated. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Because of the intangible nature of information 
security investment, and thus, the difficulty of 
accurately assessing the benefits of information 
security investment, economic models and financial 
indicators are not applicable in information security 
management. In practice, information security 
managers tend to follow experts’ recommendations, 
best practice suggestions, and the practices followed 
in other organizations. This study attempted to provide 
an alternative strategy in information security 
investment decision-making from a reputational 
herding perspective. The proposed model was 
examined, and the research results provide insights 
into making information security investment 
decisions. 
However, this study has certain limitations. First, 
as is the case with most IS research, data was collected 
from within a single country. It may be that the results 
of this study cannot be applied generally to other 
countries and cultures. A much-needed avenue of 
future research is to examine the effects across 
cultures. Another limitation is the use of field studies 
as the only methodology. Although field studies offer 
the benefits of generalizability by examining 
professionals in actual organizational settings, there 
are several weaknesses, such as poor internal validity 
due to an inability to control the independent variables 
[58]. A longitudinal survey or an experiment could be 
used to provide evidence of causal effects. 
 
Appendix 
 
Questionnaire items translated from the Finnish 
version used in this study 
 
 Definition of 
construct 
Statement Source 
A1 
The degree to which 
one is able to 
accurately predict the 
issues related to using 
IS security 
management 
standards. 
I know accurately about the benefit of using this information security management 
standard. 
Self-
developed 
A2 
I know accurately what benefit we can get from using this information security 
management standard. 
A3 
My predictions for the benefit of using information security management standards 
are usually accurate. 
DOI1 
The degree to which a 
person disregards his 
or her own beliefs 
about a particular IS 
security management 
standard when making 
a decision. 
My use of this information security management standard is not totally based on my 
own preferences. 
[18] 
DOI2 
I didn’t make the decision about using the information security management standard 
totally based on my own preferences. 
DOI3 
It is not my own preferences that select this information security management 
standard. 
MAND1 
Using information 
security standards is 
required by 
regulations. 
Regulation requires information security management standards be used in my 
organization. 
[35] MAND2 
Legislation requires information security management standards be used in my 
organization. 
MAND3 
Our organization is required to use information security management standards 
according to the regulations. 
R1 
The extent to which IS 
security managers are 
perceived by others as 
performing their jobs 
competently. 
I am regarded highly in managing information security in my organization. [30] 
R2 I have a good reputation for managing information security in my organization. 
R3 I have a reputation for producing good results in information security management. 
R4 
I have a reputation for producing a high-quality performance in information security 
management. 
SI1 
The extremeness of 
information that 
predicts the possible 
outcomes of using IS 
security management 
standards. 
I know information about this information security management standard, which is: 
Extremely                          Neutral                                Extremely  
negative                                                                           positive                
   1              2              3              4              5              6              7 Self-
developed 
SI2 
I have information about this information security management standard, which is: 
Extremely                          Neutral                                Extremely  
negative                                                                           positive                
   1              2              3              4              5              6              7 
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SI3 
There is information about this information security management standard, which is: 
Extremely                          Neutral                                Extremely  
negative                                                                           positive                
   1              2              3              4              5              6              7 
U1 
The use of the 
information security 
standard can be seen 
as a sort of 
investment, because it 
takes time and 
resources. 
To what extent do you apply the information security management standard in your 
current organization? 
[36]  U2 
I apply all parts of the information security management standard in my current 
organization. 
U3 
To what extent do you apply the information security management standard in your 
current organization? 
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